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ABSTRACT 
 
While prevailing wisdom suggests that less corrupt and more democratic countries per-
form better economically, the existing literature is, at best, inconsistent. We build a theory that 
links corruption and regime type to economic growth and test it on 158 countries, using multi-
ple databases including Polity IV, transparency international, and other the World Bank. In 
this way, we are able to show that under autocracy, corruption is less harmful to economic 
growth than under anocracy, thereby, resolving some of the inconsistent and contradictory 
results of the aforementioned literature linking corruption to economic growth. The article 
shows that democracies have the lowest level of corruption, while autocracies outperform 
anocracies economically because they embed corruption more efficiently. Policies should 
minimize disruptions and efficiency losses caused by corruption during the transition from 
autocracy to democracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the theory that corruption hurts economic development is logical 
and widely accepted, it is notoriously poor in predicting or explaining the var-
ious patterns in the corruption–economic growth relationship across countries. 
Recognizing that both corruption and economic performance are closely relat-
ed to the type of political system, scholars of political economy have recently 
begun to examine the relationships among corruption, economic performance, 
and the political system in an attempt to shed light on the different conditions 
under which corruption may impact the economy. These efforts, however, 
have thus far achieved limited success, leaving the mystery of the corruption–
growth relationship largely intact and questions as to why democratization has 
not effectively reduced corruption in some countries, such as Ukraine or Indo-
nesia, unanswered. 
 
Studies of the effect of corruption on economic growth, albeit their long 
history, have failed to produce conclusive evidence of a negative impact both 
at the macro (e.g., Li & Wu, 2010) and micro (e.g., Vial & Hanoteau, 2010) 
levels. Even though the literature is growing rapidly, empirical evidence about 
the relationship remains elusive. 
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Studies on political regime and economic growth, which also have a long 
history, have not fared much better. Empirical evidence on the relationship is 
inclusive; for instance, an economy can achieve high growth under either a 
democracy or a dictatorship (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi, 2000; 
Libman, 2012).Examining the Russian regions between 2000 and 2004, Lib-
man (2012) found that those regions with a high level of democracy and a 
high level of autocracy performed better than hybrid regions. Furthermore, the 
literature on democratization often simply divides countries into two types, 
democracies or non-democracies (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010), failing 
to account for countries that are undergoing rapid transition from dictatorship 
to democracy. 
 
In this study, we attempt to address these weaknesses by proposing a new 
perspective to understand the effects of corruption on economic performance 
by simultaneously examining the relationships of corruption and regime type 
on economic growth. In particular, we look at how the interactions between 
corruption and regime type affect economic performance across countries. 
Drawing on past studies (Li & Wu, 2010, Schofield & Gallego, 2011; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993), we propose corruption will affect economic performance in 
different ways under the following three different political regimes: autocra-
cies (dictatorships or totalitarian regimes), anocracies (including emerging and 
infant democracies), and democracies1.We argue that although mature democ-
racies are best in terms of controlling corruption and they tend to have high 
levels of economic development, corruption exerts differing effects on autoc-
racies and anocracies. As compared to anocracies, corruption in autocracies 
may be less harmful due to the centralized control over bribe-taking. That is, 
public resources are efficiently awarded to those making bribes. In contrast, 
corruption in anocracies, or during the transition stage from an autocratic to a 
more democratic government, is usually accompanied by a decrease in effi-
ciency (e.g., a briber pays, but the bribee fails to deliver due to the weakening 
political power of corrupt officials).As a result, due as well to the underdevel-
oped institutions and weak state apparatus, growth will be lower in anocracies 
than in dictatorships. To test these conjectures, we compiled data on corrup-
tion, regime type, and economic growth for 158 countries with multiple years 
of observations. The statistical analyses support our argument. 
 
Our key contribution is to link corruption with regime type and to reveal 
that corruption will become worse during the transitional stage of democrati-
zation. Using a rigorous empirical analyses, we show that the negative effect 
of corruption is worse in anocracies than it is in autocracies. Our finding adds 
a missing piece to the mystery of the corruption‒growth relationship by 
demonstrating why some countries thrive despite corruption and why democ-
ratization does not automatically eliminate corruption. From a public-policy 
                                                             
1. We refer to mature democracies with a strong rule of law and democratic institutions 
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perspective, our study demonstrates that there is no support to the argument 
that dictators use the increases in corruption and declines in economic growth 
during a democratic transition to defend their totalitarian rule. A government 
undergoing democratic transition should formulate policies that effectively 
fight corruption and increase governing capacity, thus minimizing the negative 
impact of corruption on economic growth. In the following sections, we will 
review existing studies on the relationship among corruption, regime type, and 
economic growth, develop and test our hypotheses, and discuss the contribu-
tions and policy implications of this study. 
 
2. CORRUPTION, REGIME TYPE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
2.1 CORRUPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Corruption, whereby a government official sells the public goods under his 
control to a firm (or to an individual) that bribes him for his/her private gains, 
raises the costs of doing business. Corruption has both direct (bribes, red tape, 
unproductive behavior, organized crime) and indirect (reduced investment, 
distorted public expenditures, macroeconomic weakness and instability, social 
economic failure, squandered entrepreneurial talent) costs (Doh, et al., 
2003).Corruption affects a society politically, economically, and culturally, 
and scholars from both the social science and humanity fields have studied it. 
For example, there is a rich literature on the nature of corruption using various 
analytical lenses (see, for example, Lopez and Santos, 2014, Kimeu, 2014, 
Hill 2013, Antoci and Sacco, 2002).We particularly contribute to the field of 
political economy by focusing on the effect of corruption on economic growth 
moderated by political regime type. 
 
From the economic perspective, a corrupt government official is motivated 
to choose projects that maximize opportunities for bribes rather than projects 
that maximize public benefit, distorting the efficient allocation of resources in 
a free market and thus negatively affecting the long-term growth prospects 
(Gupta, de Mello & Sharan, 2001; Mauro 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; 
Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998).Reiter and Steensma (2010), in an examination of the 
influence of corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) on developing 
countries, suggest that the relationship between FDI and improvements in hu-
man development is strong and positive when the level of corruption is low. In 
sum, lower corruption will lead to higher economic growth. 
 
Although the negative effects of corruption on economic growth are indis-
putable from a logical perspective, scholars have developed theories and con-
ducted empirical studies that contradict the idea that corruption only plays a 
negative role in economic development. While there are many studies that find 
a negative effect of corruption on economic growth (Hall & Jones, 1999; Mau-
ro, 1995; Myrdal, 1989), other studies suggest that corruption may contribute 
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to development by “greasing the wheels” (Méon & Weill, 2010; Vial& Hano-
teau, 2010). Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) find that there may exist a level of 
corruption that maximizes economic development in developing countries, 
partly because graft will provide an alternative channel to stimulate investment 
in the case of failure of the public sector. Leff (1968) suggests that military 
dictators may be better poised to modernize and where corruption is prevalent, 
weaker firms will become more efficient and productive. The costs of combat-
ing corruption may outweigh the benefits (Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998; 
Klitgaard, 1988). In developing countries in particular, pervasive corruption 
may be relatively immune to intervention as it becomes a norm (Mishra, 2006).  
 
These inconsistencies in the research findings on the role of corruption in 
economic growth suggest that some major explanatory factors may be missing. 
Specifically, corruption should be addressed in the context of the type of gov-
ernment. Before we develop our theory linking political regime to corruption 
and growth, a review of the literature on regime type and economic growth is 
in order. 
 
2.2 REGIME TYPE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
  
There is a rich literature on the impact of regime type on economic growth, 
originating initially in the field of political economy and focusing primarily on 
democracy. Although it may be appealing intuitively, however, research on 
democracy does not reveal a consistent positive linear relationship between 
democracy and growth (Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, 2006).  
 
Feng (1995) suggests there are three schools of thought that relate democ-
racy to economic growth. (1) The “conflict school” argues that a democracy 
will inhibit economic growth when a country is underdeveloped because of 
dysfunctional state operations due to the immaturity of democracy and the 
lack of control over economic activities. In contrast, autocracies will be more 
able to achieve growth as they are able to accumulate and distribute resources 
more efficiently. Advocates of this school of thought include political scien-
tists Huntington (1968), Moore (1966), and Sirowy and Inkeles (1990). (2) In 
contrast, the “compatibility school” suggests that a democracy that promotes 
political and economic freedoms will enhance property rights, market compe-
tition, and economic growth (see, for example, Rothstein, 2011). (3) The 
“skeptical school” does not find any relationship between democracy and eco-
nomic development (see, for example, Pye, 1966). This school of thought ar-
gues that economic policies (such as import substitution, industrial policy, and 
so forth), rather than democracy per se will affect economic growth. 
 
Empirical findings are conflicting, ranging from there being no relation-
ship (Bilson 1982), a strong positive relationship (Grier & Tullock 1989), a 
weak positive relationship (Kormendi & McGuire 1985), or a negative rela-
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tionship (Helliwell 1994; Landau 1986; Weede 1983) between regime type 
and economic growth. In sum, the inconsistencies in the findings in both cor-
ruption-growth and regime type–growth studies suggest that we must consider 
the three variables simultaneously. In the next subsection, we will review what 
we know about the relationship among the three. 
 
2.3 CORRUPTION, REGIME TYPE, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Scholars have increasingly begun to speculate that the type of political re-
gime may moderate the effect of corruption on economic growth. Below we 
describe some of the research that supports this argument. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) analyze the effect of corruption on economic 
growth from an industrial organization perspective, arguing that there are three 
types of bribery–corruption arrangements: (1) a monopoly whereby only one 
entity sells government goods for bribes; (2) a power structure whereby multi-
ple independent entities sell complementary government goods for bribes, and 
(3) a system whereby each of the complementary goods may be sold by at 
least two competing agencies. Shleifer and Vishny further argue that corrup-
tion is worse in the second arrangement and is the least harmful in the third 
arrangement (the competing-agency scenario). 
 
Ehrlich and Lui (1999) build a balanced, endogenous growth equilibrium 
model linking corruption, government, and growth. According to their reason-
ing, political agents are motivated, on the one hand, by the maximization of 
human capital that engenders growth and, on the other hand, by the maximiza-
tion of political capital that ensures bureaucratic power. They find that the 
relationship between corruption and growth exists only in democratic regimes, 
and autocratic regimes and command economies may achieve higher growth 
than decentralized democracies if they maximize the long-term growth pro-
spects of productive agents while controlling corruption. 
 
Drury, Krieckhaus and Lusztig (2006) suggest that democracy moderates 
the impact of corruption on growth. They claim that in mature democracies, 
electoral mechanisms dampen corruption as political agents must seek re-
election. Using a dataset of 100 countries over a period of 16 years, the au-
thors show that corruption had no effect on economic growth in democracies, 
but had a significant and negative impact in other regime types.  
 
Aidt et al. (2008) suggest that the effect of corruption on growth is condi-
tional on the governance regime. In regimes characterized by high-quality po-
litical and economic institutions, corruption has a significant and negative im-
pact on growth. In contrast, in regimes featuring low-quality political and eco-
nomic institutions, growth will not be affected by corruption. 
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Attempting to explain the East Asian paradox (high corruption coupled 
with high growth), Rock and Bonnett (2004) posit that a cross-country rela-
tionship is not robust and that in the newly industrialized economies of East 
Asia there are stable and mutually beneficial exchanges between government 
officials and business leaders who offer bribes and provide kickbacks. Méon 
and Weill (2010) suggest that corruption is less detrimental to growth in coun-
tries where the institutional environment is weak.  
 
A study by Li and Wu (2010), although not focusing specifically on politi-
cal regime type, proposes that corruption may be growth-enhancing in rela-
tion-based societies (such as the East Asian Tigers), where the level of extend-
ed particularized trust is high. In such societies, powerful bureaucrats will sell 
public resources to those firms that can pay the highest bribes through extend-
ed, trust-based informal networks, and consequently the bribe-givers can trust 
that the recipients of the bribes will perform according to their implicit agree-
ments across time or space. This may help to explain why some countries with 
high corruption (such as China) can still achieve high growth, while others 
(such as the Philippines) cannot. This study reveals that corruption may be less 
harmful in countries in which thick informal relational networks exist. Simi-
larly, Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2009) used a dynamic general equilibri-
um model to explore why corruption is less harmful in some countries than in 
others and found that organized corruption networks tend to display lower 
level of bribes and therefore higher growth rates than countries with disor-
ganized corruption arrangements. 
 
The above studies suggest that the effect of corruption on economic 
growth is moderated by the institutional social environment, such as the cul-
ture, the governance environment (Li & Wu, 2010), or the political system 
(Aidt et al., 2008; Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, 2006; Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). This provides a basis for our proposed framework 
on the link among corruption, regime type, and economic growth, as elaborat-
ed upon below. 
 
2.4 REGIME TYPE, CORRUPTION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
THE ROLE OF TRANSITION 
 
We propose that corruption exerts different effects on economic growth in 
the following three types of political regime (see Marshall and Cole (2011) for 
definitions, and a list of the countries falling under each type of political re-
gime is included in Appendix A). 
 
Type 1—Autocracy: This is a totalitarian regime, or dictatorship, such as 
Suharto’s Indonesia or Marcos’ Philippines, characterized by a strong dictator 
who wields iron control over society. The objective is to centrally maximize 
total bribes. In such a regime, the targets of the bribes are clear and the deliv-
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ery of goods to the briber is secure. We call this a “one big mafia” corruption 
model. This type of government, similar to those in China, Iran, or Syria (be-
fore the revolution), dominates economic activities. Using the framework pro-
vided by Li and Wu (2010), these societies, where bribery may be efficient, 
are characterized by a strong relation orientation coupled with societal trust. 
Campos, Lien, and Pradhan (1999) suggest that corrupt regimes that are pre-
dictable (in terms of corruption leading to favors) have less of a negative im-
pact on investment. 
 
Type 2—Anocracy: This is a political structure in which power is divided 
among multiple independent agencies, referred to as a “many small mafias” 
model. This regime type may be the result of a breakdown of the “one big ma-
fia” regime and the emergence of democracy. Examples include countries 
where totalitarianism is weakening and democracy is in its infancy, such as 
Russia in the 1990s, Indonesia immediately after the fall of Suharto, or Egypt 
after the Arab Spring. Anocracy is characterized by a weak central govern-
ment and many agencies that control complementary government goods. Each 
agency maximizes its own bribes independent of the other agencies and col-
lectively drives bribes to prohibitively high levels, thus stifling growth. Ac-
cording to Li and Wu (2010), in these societies, old relations begin to decline 
and trust is low, thus leading to low economic growth. In anocracies, power is 
not effectively exercised as in either mature democracy or full dictatorship, but 
rather it is spread out among elite groups that are competing for power, lead-
ing to turf wars among government agencies and, thus, overall economic inef-
ficiency.  
 
Type 3—A mature democracy: A mature democracy is characterized by 
governmental checks and balances that substantially reduce or minimize mo-
nopolies over key government services. As an example, there are at least two 
government agencies that offer key government services (e.g., the U.S. pass-
port agencies).Such societies exist in North America and Western Europe, but 
mature democracies have also emerged in other parts of the world (e.g., Bot-
swana, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, and Uruguay). In a mature democracy, effec-
tive government checks and balances among the branches of government and 
a non-political and independent legal system keep corruption at its lowest lev-
els, as compared to its levels in the two other regime types (Feng, 1995; Jalles, 
2011; Krieckhaus, 2006).Mature democracies are closely associated with ma-
ture free markets and high levels of economic development, but where, given 
the high levels of economic development and of per capita income, the growth 
rate inevitably will slow down (Horn, 2011; Swaleheen & Stansel, 2007). For 
corruption to occur, government officials must possess quasi-monopoly power 
or authority that allows them to support individuals within and across activi-
ties (Dey, 1989). Because in democracies there are more checks and balances 
and more restrictions on the power of specific people and branches of gov-
ernment, democracies contain fewer seeds of corruption.  
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In contrast, in an autocracy power is concentrated in the ruling party or the 
elite, which has an incentive to maximize the total amount of corruption and to 
develop the economy (so that it can extract further bribes and prevent a poten-
tial overthrow).This incentive encourages the ruling party/elite to award eco-
nomic resources and projects to those firms that pay the highest bribes, assum-
ing all bribers subject to the same project specifications, the highest bribe pay-
er is the most efficient. As a result, corruption is less harmful and can actually 
be efficiency-enhancing (Li & Wu, 2010).  
 
The most interesting, and the least discussed, issue is how corruption af-
fects economic growth in anocracies. Here we examine the power of bureau-
crats during the transition from autocratic to democratic governance. An anoc-
racy oftentimes exists during the stage when an autocratic society begins polit-
ical and economic reforms but does not complete the process (e.g., the ex-
Soviet countries), and thus the society are only partially democratized. The 
resultant system still contains elements of the old autocracy, with oligarchic 
elites vying for both economic resources and political power. The struggles 
over resources and power lead to a fractionalization of economic activity. Be-
cause of the breakdown in the supreme power of a single actor (the autocrat), 
independent political agents attempt to maximize their own rents, raising the 
total cost of corruption. Furthermore, since power is diffused among several 
elite groups, the bribe-taker cannot guarantee the delivery of favors. Thus, the 
growth-enhancing benefits of corruption may be less than those under an au-
tocracy. As such, partially democratized countries will have a higher level of 
corruption and this corruption will likely have a more negative impact on eco-
nomic growth as compared to that in an autocracy. 
 
The above classification is also supported by other’s studies. Doh et al. 
(2003) suggests that corruption split into two dimensions: pervasiveness 
(number and frequency of transactions and people) and arbitrariness govern-
ment agents act independently and capriciously).In anocracies, corruption is 
most damaging because these societies are high in both pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness (such as in Russia), while in autocracies, while corruption may be 
pervasive, it is less arbitrary and therefore more efficient (such as in China). In 
democracies, in contrast, corruption is efficiently and effectively prosecuted 
by law and thus substantially reduced, making the issue of pervasiveness and 
arbitrariness less relevant.  
 
Several studies have concentrated on the role of transition in economic 
growth. Most notable are the comparisons between Russia and China (e.g. 
Wedeman, 2012; Sun, 1999; Larsson, 2006) that take these two countries as 
examples to illustrate why corruption is more harmful for economic growth in 
some countries than in others. These studies maintain that it is the nature of 
reforms that matters (i.e. economic reforms within autocratic political system 
as in China, or simultaneous economic and political reforms as in Russia) for a 
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certain type of corruption to become prevalent. China is an autocracy, while 
Russia is an anocracy, according to Polity IV.  
 
Figure 1. China vs. Russia in Polity Score (source: Polity IV project)2 
 
Sun (1999) suggests that China’s strong authoritative-style governance, 
which includes numerous mechanisms, such as mass monitoring system, the 
Center of Reporting Economic Crimes, office for the inspection of tax reve-
nues, bookkeeping and consumer prices, and party’s disciplinary committees, 
is not crippling. In contrast, in Russia during transition, the regime reputation 
for discipline broke apart and top echelons abuses of the system were routinely 
ignored, including unabashed transfer of public property to themselves and 
their cronies. Russia’s state weakness in controlling banks, commodity ex-
changes and stock markets, frequent bribery in the court system, and mafia 
dominated economy stifled economic growth. The comparison between Russia 
and China strengthens our argument relating to the corruption-polity-growth 
propositions. One implication of our research is that the dominant form of 
corruption in anocracies might be extortion, while in autocracies mutually 
beneficial exchange. Figure 1 shows the political transition of Russia and Chi-
                                                             
2. Retrieved May 20, 2016 from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
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na since 1946.While China’s polity remained autocratic, Russia has shifted 
towards an anocracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
Political regimes are not static and countries move between the three types 
of regimes over time. Since the 1990s, the world has witnessed a trend of au-
tocracies moving to democracies. However, before these autocracies evolve 
into full democracies, they go through anocracies, which are the least stable 
with weakest governing capacity because the power of the old autocratic elite 
begins to decline and yet the new rule of law has not been established (Mar-
shall and Cole, 2011).As a result, before corruption can be eventually reduced 
when the country achieves well-functioning full democracy, corruption will be 
more severe and less efficient, because there are more officials to bribe and 
few of them are able to deliver the public goods to the briber.  
 
Summarizing our review of the literature and our ideas elaborated upon 
above, we propose the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a.In terms of the level of corruption, Type 3 (mature democ-
racies) regime types are the least corrupt as compared to Type 1 (autocracies) 
and Type 2 (anocracies) regime types; 
 
Hypothesis 1b.In terms of the level of corruption, Type 2 (anocracies) re-
gime types are more corrupt than Type 1 (autocracies) regime types. 
 
In sum, the relationship between regime type and corruption is nonlinear: 
corruption rises from autocracy to anocracy, peaks at anocracy, and declines 
from anocracy to the lowest level in democracy. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
argue that if the organization of “corruption networks” is weak due to the 
breakdown of the political monopoly, the person paying the bribe is not as-
sured that he will get the government goods and services and numerous bu-
reaucrats need to be bribed, decreasing the efficiency of the bribe. 
 
Hypothesis 2a.In terms of economic growth, Type 3 (mature democracies) 
regime types, which are the most developed of the three types, have the lowest 
economic growth rate as compared to the growth rates in Type 1 (autocracies) 
and Type 2 (anocracies) regime types. 
 
Hypothesis 2b.In terms of economic growth, Type 1 (autocracies) regime 
types are more efficient than Type 2 (anocracies) regime types. 
 
Hypothesis 3.In terms of the corruption‒regime interaction effects on 
growth, corruption is more harmful to economic growth in Type 2 (anocracies) 
regime types than it is in Type 1 (autocracies) regime types. In other words, 
corruption will enhance economic growth in Type 1 (autocracies) regime types 
whereas it will hurt economic growth in Type 2 (autocracies) regime types. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 TESTING STRATEGY 
 
We collected data from reputable publicly available sources that cover all 
countries and use appropriate statistical analytical tools. More specifically, we 
used correlation analysis and multivariate regression analyses to establish the 
relationship among the variables and to identify patterns among the variables 
so as to determine whether our hypotheses are supported. 
 
3.2 DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
 
The key constructs we are trying to measure are economic growth, corrup-
tion, and regime type. Past studies have successfully operationalized these 
constructs into variables that are well established and commonly used. Follow-
ing earlier studies, we developed our measurements (including the control 
variables) as follows: 
 
Economic Growth (dependent variable).We have two measurements for 
Economic Growth, GDP growth rate (GDP_growth) and GDP per capita 
growth rate (GDP_PC_growth).Both are collected from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 2013).To measure economic growth, we 
used the average of the annual GDP growth rate and the annual GDP per capi-
ta growth rate from 2008 to 2012. 
 
The key predictor variables are corruption and regime type. To make our 
study robust, we use six different measurement of Corruption.CPI_5YA is 
adopted from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transpar-
ency International (from 2008 to 2012). We transformed the original CPI score 
so that it ranges from 0 (most clean) to 10 (most corrupt) and we measured it 
by taking the average for the five years from 2008 to 2012.CPI_2011R and 
CPI_2010R are rescaled CPI from year 2011 and 2010, respective-
ly.ICRG2012R is the rescaled corruption indicator of Political Risk component 
of International Country Risk Guide in 2012, ranging from 0 (most clean) to 6 
(most corrupt).CoCorrupt2011R and CoCorrupt2010R are control of corrup-
tion indicator in 2011 and 2010 from Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) 
developed by World Bank. They were reversed coded into a range of -2.5 
(most clean) to +2.5 (most corrupt). 
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Table 1.Data Sources and Definitions of the Variables 
Variable Data Source Variable Description 
GDP_growth World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) (World Bank, 
2013) 
The average of the annual percentage of the GDP growth rate 
at market prices based on constant local currency for the five 
years from 2008 to 2012.  
GDP_PC_growth World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) (World Bank, 
2013) 
The average of the annual percentage of the GDP per capita 
growth rate based on constant local currency for the five years 
from 2008 to 2012. 
GNI_PC_PPP World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) (World Bank, 
2013) 
The average of GNI per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP) for the five years from 2008 to 2012.Unit: thou-
sand dollars 
Employment_5YA World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) (World Bank, 
2013) 
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (modeled ILO 
estimate).We took the five years average from 2008 to 
2012.Indicator code: SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS 
Trade_5YA World Development Indica-
tors (WDI) (World Bank, 
2013) 
Trade (% of GDP).We took the five years average from 2008 
to 2012.Indicator Code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS 
CPI_5YA;  
CPI2011R; 
 CPI2010R: 
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) (Transparency 
International, 2008‒2012) 
Transparency International (2008 to 2012) corruption indices 
from the CPI. The original CPI between 2008 and 2010 ranged 
from 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (most clean).The CPI in 2011 and 
2012 ranged from 0 (most corrupt) to 100 (most clean).We first 
transferred the CPI in 2011 and 2012 to ranges between 0 and 
10 by dividing the CPI by 10.We then reverse coded the CPI 
by subtracting the CPI from 11 so that a higher score indicates 
more corruption, thus making it easier to interpret the test 
results.Corruption_5YA is the average of the transformed CPI 
score for the five years from 2008 to 2012.We also took the 
rescaled score in 2011 (CPI2011R) and 2010 (CPI2010R) in 
our analysis. 
ICRG2012R International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) (PRS Group, 
Inc.) 
The corruption indicator from Political Risk component. It is 
ranged from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 (most clean).We rescaled it 
with a higher score indicating more corrupt. 
CoCorrupt2011R; 
CoCorrupt2010R 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (World 
Bank, 2013) 
Control of Corruption, ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) 
to 2.5 (strong) governance performance. We reverse coded it 
so that a higher score shows more corruption. We took the 
value from 2011 and 2010. 
Autocracy, Anocra-
cy, Democracy 
Polity IV Project: Political 
Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800‒2012 
The measurement of Autocracy and Anocracy is converted 
from the polity score in the Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800‒2012.The polity score 
ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy).The Polity IV Project also groups countries into 
full democracies (polity=10), democracies (polity scores 
ranging from 6 to 9), open anocracies (polity score ranging 
from 1 to 5), closed anocracies (polity scores ranging from -5 
to 0), and autocracies (-10 to -6).In addition, some countries 
have polity scores of (-88), (-77), and (-65), which means that 
the country is either undergoing transition, or it has failed, or it 
is occupied. We took the polity score in 2011 and grouped full 
democracy and democracy to form our democracy (polity 
scores ranging from 6 to 10), grouped open anocracy and 
closed anocracy to form our anocracy (polity scores ranging 
from -5 to 5).Our autocracy is the same as that in the Polity IV 
Project (polity scores ranging from -10 to -6).We excluded 
transitional, failed, or occupied countries. 
Literacy UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics, in EdStats, 
January 2014 
Literacy is the national adult literacy rate (15+) from the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics in EdStats. Many countries 
have missing data. Therefore, the literacy data for most coun-
tries are collected for the year 2011.If the 2011 data are miss-
ing, the data for the most recent available year are collected. 
 
The regime type includes three categories: Autocracy, Anocracy, and De-
mocracy. The measurements for Autocracy, Anocracy, and Democracy are 
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converted from the 2011 polity score from the Polity IV Project, the most 
widely used data source for the study of political regimes 
(www.systmicpeac.org, 2014).Polity IV Project (The Project thereafter) 
measures the authority characteristics of states over 194 countries in the world. 
The Polity score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to (-10) (strongly au-
tocratic). Based on polity score, the Project classified countries into five 
groups: Autocracy with polity scores ranging from (-10) to (-6), Closed Anoc-
racy with polity scores from -5 to 0, Open Anocracy in which polity score is 
between 1 and 5, Democracy having a polity score between 6 and 9, and Full 
Democracy with the highest polity score of 10.  
 
In this study, Autocracy, Anocracy, and Democracy are coded as dummy 
variables based on the scores of Polity IV Project. Democracy, which com-
bines Democracy and Full Democracy from The Project, equals to 1 if the 
polity score is 6 or greater, otherwise 0.Anocracy (including Closed Anocracy 
and Open Anocracy) is 1 if the polity score ranges from -5 to 5, otherwise 0.In 
the same fashion, Autocracy is 1 if the polity score is between -10 and -6, and 
otherwise 0 (The detailed county classification is Appendix A). 
 
We control for income level (GNI per capita), the level of human capital 
through education, employment to population ratio and trade to GDP ratio. 
Income level is measured by GNI per capita, which is taken from World De-
velopment Indicators developed by the World Bank. We use the literacy rate 
to measure education, which is the national adult literacy rate (age 15+) as 
measured by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics in EdStats. Employment to 
population ratio and trade to GDP ratio are both collected from the World De-
velopment Indicators of the World Bank. More detailed descriptions and 
measurements of the variables are available in Table 1. 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE AND CORRELATION ANALYSES 
 
The data description and correlation matrix are shown in Table 2.The cor-
relations of the six measurement of Corruption are significantly high, ranged 
from 0.898 to 0.996.But they will not appear in the same regression, but, ra-
ther, used as a check of robustness. GDP_growth and GDP_PC_growth, the 
two dependent variables, are highly correlated (0.885).Similarly, they will be 
used separately in the different models. Thus these high correlations do not 
cause any multicollinearity concerns. But the high correlation between corrup-
tion measures and GNI_PC_PPP may lead to multicollinearity. Thus we check 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) for any possible multicollinearity between 
them. 
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We first compare the levels of corruption, economic growth rates, and 
economic development among the different regime types, as shown in Table 
3.As can be seen, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measured corruption 
levels in these three regime types are significantly different from one another. 
Though the difference measured by ICRG and Control of Corruption in anoc-
ractic and autocratic countries are not significant, the corruption level is the 
highest in anocractic countries and it is the lowest in democratic regimes, 
lending support to Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
 
Table 2.Data Description and Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 GDPgrowth_5YA 1              
2 GDP_PC_growth_5YA 0.883 1            
3 GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.441 -0.381 1          
4 Literacy -0.254 -0.056 0.512 1        
5 Employment_5YA 0.353 0.136 -0.134 -0.322 1      
6 Trade_5YA -0.032 -0.023 0.401 0.303 -0.124 1    
7 Autocracy 0.224 0.083 -0.110 0.200 0.082 0.002 1  
8 Anocracy 0.212 0.121 -0.342 -0.368 0.195 -0.095 -0.167 1 
9 Polity2011 -0.352 -0.121 0.370 0.072 -0.226 -0.021 -0.731 -0.386 
10 CPI_5YA 0.407 0.379 -0.842 -0.337 0.081 -0.296 0.128 0.361 
11 CPI2011R 0.390 0.374 -0.844 -0.322 0.050 -0.290 0.113 0.337 
12 CPI2010R 0.383 0.364 -0.848 -0.359 0.065 -0.308 0.090 0.357 
13 ICRG2012R 0.383 0.372 -0.777 -0.284 0.007 -0.269 0.125 0.306 
14 CoCorrupt2011R 0.349 0.298 -0.770 -0.328 0.080 -0.277 0.167 0.353 
15 CoCorrupt2010R 0.358 0.324 -0.765 -0.327 0.074 -0.281 0.144 0.351 
  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
9 Polity2011 -0.386 1             
10 CPI_5YA 0.361 -0.386 1           
11 CPI2011R 0.337 -0.355 0.995 1         
12 CPI2010R 0.357 -0.354 0.996 0.994 1       
13 ICRG2012R 0.306 -0.399 0.920 0.929 0.911 1     
14 CoCorrupt2011R 0.353 -0.427 0.907 0.907 0.898 0.951 1   
15 CoCorrupt2010R 0.351 -0.401 0.909 0.909 0.903 0.946 0.993 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 N 191 191 133 144 168 175 210 210 
  Mean 3.21 1.74 13.42 82.14 58.97 94.45 0.10 0.21 
  SD 3.28 2.96 13.46 19.25 11.74 51.80 0.29 0.41 
  Minimum -13.93 -17.56 0.31 25.30 31.58 24.63 0.00 0.00 
  Maximum 15.10 12.49 49.73 100.00 86.62 422.39 1.00 1.00 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
 N 158 176 176 171 136 197 197  
 Mean 4.09 6.88 6.92 6.95 3.41 -0.01 -0.02  
 SD 6.24 2.06 2.10 2.09 1.20 1.00 1.00  
 Minimum -10.00 1.71 1.54 1.70 0.50 -2.45 -2.41  
 Maximum 10.00 10.10 9.99 9.60 5.50 1.68 1.68  
Correlations in bold are significant at 0.05 level. 
 
We also see from Table 3 that economic growth, measured by both the 
GDP growth rate and the GDP per capita growth rate, is significantly higher in 
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autocratic and anocratic regimes than it is in democratic regimes, thus support-
ing H2a.Both the GDP growth rate and the GDP per capita growth rate in au-
tocratic regimes are higher than they are in anocratic regimes (with autocra-
cies’ GDP per capita growth rate significantly higher than that of anocra-
cies).Thus, although preliminary, we can say that these results support H2b. 
 
4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 
To further test the hypotheses using multivariate analysis, we ran a series 
of regression models. Panel A of Table 4 shows the results of six regression 
models to test H1a and H1b.Each model has one measurement of corruption as 
dependent variable. The independent variables are all the same. Four control 
variables are included: GNI_PC_PPP, Literacy, Employment and Trade. Two 
variables of interest, Autocracy and Anocracy (the base line type is Democra-
cy) are also incorporated. In all six models, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
were checked and the fact that they are all below the cutoff value of 10 rules 
out any concerns about multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998).As shown in all six 
models, the coefficients for Autocracy and Anocracy are all positive, showing 
that democratic regimes (the baseline) have the lowest level of corruption. 
Hypothesis 1a is strongly supported. With respect to Autocracy and Anocracy, 
the standardized coefficients for Autocracy are smaller than those for Anocra-
cy in Model 1 and Model 3 but bigger in other models. Therefore Hypothesis 
1b is only partially supported. 
 
Table 3.Group Comparison 
  
G1:  
Autocracy 
(N=20) 
G2:  
Anocracy 
(N=44) 
G3:  
Democracy 
(N=94) 
T  
(G1, G2) 
T 
(G2, 
G3) 
T 
(G1, 
G3) 
GDPgrowth_5YA 5.415 4.354 2.695 1.10* 3.11+ 3.93+ 
GDP_PC_growth_5
YA 
2.479 2.288 1.629 0.19 1.34** 1.33** 
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA 8.523 5.312 16.160 0.99* -4.47+ -1.87** 
CPI_5YA 7.608 8.231 6.272 -1.66** 5.66+ 2.65*** 
CPI2011R 7.582 8.223 6.363 -1.68** 5.16+ 2.32** 
CPI2010R 7.479 8.298 6.338 -2.09** 5.46+ 2.16** 
ICRG2012R 3.833 4.097 3.077 -1.01 4.36+ 2.24** 
CoCorrupt2011R 0.480 0.668 -0.226 -0.88 5.28+ 2.98*** 
CoCorrupt2010R 0.408 0.659 -0.213 -1.14 5.12+ 2.58*** 
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed). 
 
To further ascertain the nonlinear relationship between regime type and 
corruption, we ran a regression with Polity score (ranging from -10 to 10) and 
Polity score squared as independent variables and corruption as dependent 
variables, controlling for income level, education level, employment ratio and 
trade ratio (see panel B of Table 4).The results support Hypotheses 1a and 1b: 
corruption increases from autocracies to anocracies, peaks near the mid-level 
anocracy (around Polity score of -2 when corruption measured by CPI, or -1 
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when corruption measured by other methods), and declines from there on into 
democracy. 
 
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we ran a series regression models shown in 
Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 has GDP growth rate (GDP_growth) as dependent 
variable, and in Panel B the dependent variable was changed to GDP per capi-
ta growth rate (GDP_PC_growth).In each Panel, six regressions were con-
ducted. In each regression, the same four control variables (GNI_PC_PPP, 
Literacy, Employment to Population Ratio and Trade to GDP Ratio) were in-
cluded. The variables of interest, Corruption, Autocracy, and Anocracy (the 
baseline is still Democracy) were also added. Each model uses one measure-
ment of corruption. In all 12 models, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are 
below the cutoff value of 10 (Hair et al., 1998), ruling out serious concerns 
over multicollinearity. 
  
Table 4.Multiple Regressions on Corruption (Panel A) 
Panel A 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 7.348+ 0.914   7.848+ 0.934   7.496+ 0.914   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.084+ 0.013 -0.606 -0.089+ 0.013 -0.639 -0.090+ 0.013 -0.632 
Literacy 0.007 0.007 0.093 0.007 0.007 0.090 0.008 0.007 0.100 
Employment_5YA 0.008 0.009 0.074 0.002 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.009 0.061 
Trade_5YA -0.004** 0.002 -0.146 -0.004* 0.002 -0.127 -0.004** 0.002 -0.144 
Autocracy 0.650** 0.353 0.137 0.547* 0.361 0.115 0.616** 0.353 0.128 
Anocracy 0.459** 0.237 0.152 0.330* 0.242 0.109 0.456** 0.236 0.148 
N 106     106     106     
Adjusted R Square 0.485     0.470     0.506     
F 17.475+     16.499+     18.917+     
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DV ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.437+ 0.802   0.337 0.562   0.312 0.568   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.040+ 0.011 -0.470 -0.044+ 0.008 -0.575 -0.043+ 0.008 -0.565 
Literacy -0.002 0.006 -0.034 0.001 0.004 0.032 0.002 0.004 0.043 
Employment_5YA -0.003 0.008 -0.040 0.003 0.006 0.057 0.004 0.006 0.061 
Trade_5YA -0.001 0.002 -0.063 -0.001 0.002 -0.034 -0.001 0.002 -0.049 
Autocracy 0.479* 0.332 0.149 0.392** 0.217 0.151 0.381** 0.219 0.147 
Anocracy 0.068 0.189 0.038 0.109 0.145 0.066 0.096 0.147 0.058 
N 86     106     106     
Adjusted R Square 0.222     0.354     0.342     
F 5.034+     10.556+     10.083+     
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed).B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: 
Standard error; Beta: Standardized coefficients. 
 
As shown in Table 5, the coefficients for corruption are all negative (sig-
nificant when corruption is measured by CPI) which shows that corruption 
negatively affects economic growth. The coefficients for Autocracy and Anoc-
racy are all positive in all 12 models and mostly significant, indicating that 
autocratic and anocratic regimes have higher economic growth rates than 
democratic regimes, providing support for Hypothesis 2a.Furthermore, the 
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coefficients for Autocracy are higher than those for Anocracy in all 12 models, 
thus also supporting Hypothesis 2b.  
 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by running the models shown in Table 6.The de-
pendent variables are GDP growth rate (GDP_growth) in Panel A and GDP 
per capita growth (GDP_PC_growth) in Panel B. In Table 6 we add two inter-
action terms to Table 5—Corruption X Autocracy and Corruption X Anocra-
cy—to test the moderating effects of regime type on corruption and economic 
growth. 
 
Table 4.Multiple Regressions on Corruption (Panel B) 
Panel B 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DV CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 7.541+ 0.851   7.902+ 0.897   7.806+ 0.872   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.117+ 0.015 -0.706 -0.119+ 0.016 -0.719 -0.117+ 0.015 -0.697 
Literacy 0.02*** 0.007 0.241 0.017*** 0.007 0.232 0.017*** 0.007 0.230 
Employment_5YA 0.004 0.008 0.034 -0.002 0.009 -0.013 0.002 0.009 0.021 
Trade_5YA -0.003* 0.002 -0.114 -0.003 0.002 -0.095 -0.004* 0.002 -0.123 
Polity2011 -0.034** 0.020 -0.142 -0.025 0.021 -0.107 -0.030* 0.021 -0.123 
Polity x Polity -0.008** 0.004 -0.173 -0.007* 0.004 -0.157 -0.008** 0.004 -0.185 
N 98   98   98   
Adjusted R Square 0.59   0.545   0.581   
F 24.295+   20.366+   23.446+   
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
DV ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.180+ 0.758   0.470 0.547   0.451 0.552   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.044+ 0.012 -0.467 -0.047+ 0.009 -0.534 -0.046+ 0.010 -0.519 
Literacy 0.009* 0.006 0.190 0.009** 0.004 0.222 0.009** 0.004 0.235 
Employment_5YA -0.004 0.008 -0.049 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 
Trade_5YA -0.001 0.002 -0.085 -0.001 0.002 -0.092 -0.002 0.002 -0.111 
Polity2011 -0.011 0.021 -0.076 -0.016 0.013 -0.123 -0.015 0.013 -0.120 
Polity x Polity -0.008** 0.004 -0.303 -0.006** 0.003 -0.269 -0.006** 0.003 -0.273 
N 81   98   98   
Adjusted R Square 0.318   0.404   0.393   
F 7.225+   11.94+   11.459+   
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed).B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: 
Standard error; Beta: Standardized coefficients. 
 
The results in Table 6 are quite interesting. The first observation, which is 
our main interest in this study, is that the coefficients for Anocracy X Corrup-
tion are always negative in all 12 models and mostly significant (in 8 out 12 
models), which indicates the combination of corruption and anocracy hurts 
economic growth. Meanwhile, in Panel B when the dependent variable is GDP 
per capita growth, the coefficients for Autocracy X Corruption are always pos-
itive and significant while in Panel A, most of them are positive (4 out of 6 
models), which indicates that the combination of corruption and autocracy 
enhances economic growth. In other words, the combination of corruption and 
anocracy hurts economic growth more than the combination of corruption and 
autocracy. Our hypothesis (H3) that corruption hurts anocracy more than it 
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hurts autocracy is supported. Another equally insightful finding is that the co-
efficients for Autocracy are always smaller than those for Anocracy, implying 
that after controlling for the interaction between corruption and regime type, 
Anocracy may achieve higher economic growth than Autocracy. 
 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS MEASURES AND CHECKS 
 
To assure that our testing results are robust, we used a five-year average. 
We further assessed the robustness of our tests by varying the ranges used to 
calculate the average. In the models above, most variables are the average val-
ues of the five years between 2008 and 2012.To check the robustness of these 
models, we used the average values of the three years between 2010 and 2012 
and the three years between 2008 and 2010, and then we reran all the above 
analyses. The reruns confirm our test models (available upon request). 
 
Table 5.Multiple Regressions on Economic Growth (Panel A) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: GDPgrowth_5YA 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption Measure CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.47* 2.75   5.13** 2.76   4.75** 2.75   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.20+ 0.05 -0.61 -0.20+ 0.05 -0.64 -0.20+ 0.05 -0.62 
Literacy -0.01 0.016 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 
Employment_5YA 0.05*** 0.02 0.24 0.05*** 0.02 0.22 0.05*** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.01** 0.01 0.20 0.01** 0.01 0.20 0.01** 0.01 0.20 
Autocracy 1.93** 0.81 0.21 1.92*** 0.80 0.21 1.93*** 0.80 0.21 
Anocracy 0.92** 0.55 0.16 0.89* 0.54 0.15 0.93** 0.55 0.16 
Corruption -0.43** 0.25 -0.22 -0.48** 0.23 -0.25 -0.45** 0.24 -0.24 
N 101   101   101   
Adjusted R Square 0.35   0.36   0.35   
F 8.54+   8.83+   8.66+   
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption Measure ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.82* 2.97   1.41 2.12   1.41 2.12   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.17+ 0.04 -0.55 -0.15+ 0.04 -0.469 -0.15+ 0.04 -0.47 
Literacy -0.02 0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.072 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 
Employment_5YA 0.04* 0.03 0.15 0.05*** 0.02 0.230 0.05*** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.01** 0.01 0.23 0.01** 0.01 0.221 0.01** 0.01 0.22 
Autocracy 2.50*** 1.04 0.25 1.66** 0.82 0.183 1.66** 0.82 0.18 
Anocracy 0.46 0.59 0.08 0.71* 0.55 0.121 0.71* 0.55 0.12 
Corruption -0.44 0.36 -0.14 -0.11 0.38 -0.030 -0.12 0.38 -0.03 
N 81   101   101   
Adjusted R Square 0.32   0.33   0.33   
F 6.31+   7.88+   7.88+   
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed).B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: Standard error; Beta: 
Standardized coefficients. 
 
Still to increase the robustness of our testing result, we rerun all the anal-
yses using the same five polity categories from the Polity IV Project. The re-
run results for Panel A of Table 5 could be seen in Appendix B. In all the six 
models, the default regime type is Full Democracy. All corruption measures 
are negatively related to DGP growth rate. The coefficients for Autocracy are 
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highest and significant, coefficients for Closed Anocracy and Open Anocracy 
are significant but lower than those of Autocracy, while coefficients for De-
mocracy are lowest and most are non-significant, supporting our hypotheses 
H2a and H2b.Other reruns using the five regime types also confirm our results 
(available upon request). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON REGIME TYPE, CORRUPTION, AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Worldwide corruption has attracted increasing attention from both aca-
demics and policy makers for the following reasons. First, if we examine the 
world map based on the perceived level of corruption developed by Transpar-
ency International, which uses different shades of red to indicate the level of 
corruption (darker red indicates a higher level of corruption), we find that 
since Transparency International began to draw these maps several decades 
ago, most of the world is shaded in dark red. Thus we can safely say that many 
countries are badly infected with corruption, affecting the lives of billions. 
Unfortunately, this conditions persists and is not easy to clean up. 
 
Yet some countries have achieved high economic growth despite rampant 
corruption. Which countries fall into this category? Why do their economies 
thrive despite the high levels of corruption? We offer an explanation that links 
corruption and political regime type to economic growth. Using large-scale 
data that cover 158 countries over five years, we show that during the transi-
tion stage of political development, when a former dictatorship breaks down 
and creates a decentralized power structure (as approximated by an anocracy), 
the level of corruption may increase. At the same time, due to the complemen-
tary nature of the bureaucratic power structure, bribe takers fail to deliver the 
public goods to bribers, thus creating less economic growth than under a dicta-
torship. Therefore, corruption hurts countries at a transition stage (or infant 
democracies) more than it hurts countries prior to transition, namely, autocra-
cies. If we elaborate from our results (i.e., the testing of H3 in Table 6), we 
postulate that if corruption can be kept at bay, an anocracy may achieve higher 
economic growth than an autocracy. It is the inefficient corruption in anocra-
cies that drags down their economic growth. Corruption hurts economic 
growth in all societies, but it is most harmful in transitional societies (anocra-
cies).In autocracies, corruption may be less inefficient in the sense that the 
bribe taker—the dictator—can efficiently deliver public goods to the briber. 
 
One overall conclusion from the study is that political stability (of any 
kind) would be better both for corruption control and for economic growth. 
This might be more closely linked to the economics-based argument that cor-
ruption is in general considered as harmful for economic growth because it 
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increases uncertainty and thereby transaction costs faced by firms and other 
actors in the economy. Either a “well-organized corruption system” associated 
with autocracies or effective corruption control as in democracies would there-
fore be alternative means to decrease these costs. On the other hand, breaking 
the “system” as the authors discuss is extremely difficult, which is shown 
again in the moderate success of the Chinese government in its anti-corruption 
campaign. 
 
Table 5.Multiple Regressions on Economic Growth (Panel B) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: GDP_PC_growth_5YA 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption Measure CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 3.20 2.72   3.61* 2.74   3.53* 2.72   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.23+ 0.05 -0.80 -0.23+ 0.05 -0.81 -0.23+ 0.05 -0.81 
Literacy 0.03** 0.02 0.24 0.03** 0.02 0.23 0.03** 0.02 0.24 
Employment_5YA 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.10 
Trade_5YA 0.01* 0.01 0.18 0.01** 0.01 0.18 0.01* 0.01 0.17 
Autocracy 1.10* 0.80 0.13 1.06* 0.79 0.13 1.10* 0.80 0.13 
Anocracy 0.59 0.55 0.11 0.53 0.54 0.10 0.61 0.54 0.11 
Corruption -0.51** 0.25 -0.29 -0.53** 0.23 -0.30 -0.54** 0.24 -0.31 
N 101   101   101   
Adjusted R Square 0.22   0.23   0.23   
F 4.98+   5.13+   5.12+   
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption Measure ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 2.07 2.92   -0.43 2.11   -0.42 2.11   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.20+ 0.04 -0.73 -0.18+ 0.04 -0.62 -0.18+ 0.04 -0.63 
Literacy 0.03* 0.02 0.19 0.03* 0.02 0.19 0.03* 0.02 0.19 
Employment_5YA 0.006 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.10 
Trade_5YA 0.01* 0.01 0.22 0.01** 0.01 0.20 0.01** 0.01 0.20 
Autocracy 1.54* 1.02 0.17 0.79 0.81 0.10 0.81 0.81 0.10 
Anocracy 0.16 0.58 0.03 0.34 0.54 0.06 0.34 0.54 0.07 
Corruption -0.38 0.35 -0.13 -0.15 0.38 -0.05 -0.19 0.38 -0.06 
N 81   101   101   
Adjusted R Square 0.21   0.19   0.19   
F 3.99+   4.20+   4.22+   
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed).B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: Standard error; Beta: 
Standardized coefficients. 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990 when several communist states in-
cluding Russia fell, there was a high exuberant optimism that democracy and 
free market will soon be realized in the world, highlighted by Fukuyama’s 
seminal piece, “The End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989).Of course, what hap-
pened afterwards shows history is far from ending. Our study further demon-
strates that the road to democracy is bumpy and the trajectory is not linear; the 
economy may suffer from a worsening corruption before it gets better. 
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Table 6.Multiple Regressions of Interactions on Economic Growth  
(Panel A) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: GDPgrowth_5YA 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption Measure CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 2.606 2.80   3.431 2.81   2.924 2.79   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.187+ 0.05 -0.59 -0.197+ 0.05 -0.62 -0.193+ 0.05 -0.61 
Literacy 0.001 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.02 0.001 0.001 0.02 0.01 
Employment_5YA 0.052*** 0.02 0.23 0.047** 0.02 0.21 0.051*** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.005 0.01 0.09 0.006 0.01 0.11 0.005 0.01 0.09 
Autocracy 1.621 5.00 0.18 2.507 4.74 0.28 1.839 5.29 0.20 
Anocracy 8.361*** 3.14 1.43 7.822*** 3.08 1.34 8.233*** 3.12 1.41 
Corruption -0.152 0.27 -0.08 -0.217 0.26 -0.11 -0.192 0.26 -0.10 
Autocracy x Corruption 0.013 0.62 0.01 -0.092 0.59 -0.08 -0.012 0.66 -0.01 
Anocracy x Corruption -0.949*** 0.40 -1.33 -0.881** 0.39 -1.23 -0.922** 0.39 -1.30 
N 101     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.379     0.382     0.381     
F 7.646+     7.742+     7.707+     
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption Measure ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.112* 3.09   1.633 2.09   1.657 2.08   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.146+ 0.05 -0.49 -0.108*** 0.05 -0.34 -0.110*** 0.04 -0.35 
Literacy -0.021 0.02 -0.15 -0.015 0.02 -0.10 -0.015 0.02 -0.10 
Employment_5YA 0.040* 0.03 0.16 0.051*** 0.02 0.23 0.051*** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.010* 0.01 0.18 0.009* 0.01 0.16 0.010* 0.01 0.17 
Autocracy -0.851 5.59 -0.08 0.658 1.08 0.07 0.446 1.10 0.05 
Anocracy 2.763 2.61 0.49 1.146** 0.59 0.20 1.116** 0.59 0.19 
Corruption -0.198 0.46 -0.06 0.475 0.52 0.13 0.413 0.52 0.12 
Autocracy x Corruption 0.834 1.39 0.33 1.256 1.23 0.13 1.64 1.27 0.16 
Anocracy x Corruption -0.61 0.67 -0.43 -1.172** 0.68 -0.23 -1.086* 0.67 -0.21 
N 81     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.312     0.351     0.354     
F 5.024+     6.878+     6.968+     
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed).B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: Standard error; Beta: 
Standardized coefficients. 
 
The fall of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Assad regime in Syria are 
two recent examples of moves from autocracy to anocracy. As the regimes fell, 
so did many of the supporting mechanisms that held the leaders in power. In 
2013 democracy appeared in Egypt under the banner of the Islamic Brother-
hood, but shortly thereafter it was circumvented by a military dictatorship that 
promised future elections and governance accountability. We expect that un-
der these conditions of anocracy, corruption in both Syria and Egypt will grow 
and stymie economic growth. The political instability during Ukraine’s at-
tempt to democratize in recently years which eventually led to the intervention 
from both Russia and the West (mainly the United States and the EU) provides 
another example. The power split has been leading to a fractionalization of 
society (traditionalists vs. modernizers) along geographic boundaries. We an-
ticipate that recent events in Ukraine (if they remain unresolved) will lead to 
additional corruption and economic inefficiencies. 
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Table 6.Multiple Regressions of Interactions on Economic Growth  
(Panel B) 
Panel B: Dependent Variable: GDP_PC_growth_5YA 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption Measure CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 1.928 2.70   2.431 2.71   2.07 2.69   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.191+ 0.05 -0.66 -0.194+ 0.05 -0.68 -0.19+ 0.05 -0.67 
Literacy 0.028** 0.02 0.21 0.027** 0.02 0.21 0.03** 0.02 0.22 
Employment_5YA 0.025 0.02 0.12 0.022 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.12 
Trade_5YA 0.004 0.01 0.07 0.004 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Autocracy -9.95** 4.82 -1.21 -8.82** 4.58 -1.07 -10.42** 5.08 -1.27 
Anocracy 6.17** 3.03 1.17 5.78** 2.97 1.09 6.23** 3.00 1.18 
Corruption -0.314 0.26 -0.18 -0.345* 0.25 -0.20 -0.33* 0.25 -0.19 
Autocracy x Corruption 1.369** 0.60 1.35 1.227** 0.57 1.21 1.42** 0.63 1.41 
Anocracy x Corruption -0.711** 0.38 -1.10 -0.667** 0.37 -1.03 -0.71** 0.37 -1.11 
N 101     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.297     0.297     0.303     
F 5.608+     5.604+     5.732+     
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption Measure ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 1.719 2.89   -0.106 1.101   -0.00 1.98   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.159+ 0.04 -0.58 -0.120*** 0.043 -0.418 -0.12*** 0.04 -0.43 
Literacy 0.015 0.02 0.12 0.014 0.016 0.104 0.013 0.02 0.10 
Employment_5YA 0.019 0.03 0.09 0.024 0.020 0.118 0.023 0.02 0.11 
Trade_5YA 0.009* 0.01 0.18 0.008* 0.006 0.154 0.008* 0.01 0.16 
Autocracy -12.73*** 5.24 -1.37 -1.65** 1.033 -0.201 -1.89** 1.04 -0.23 
Anocracy 1.281 2.44 0.25 0.586 0.568 0.111 0.564 0.56 0.11 
Corruption -0.331 0.43 -0.11 0.104 0.500 0.032 0.033 0.49 0.01 
Autocracy x Corruption 3.61*** 1.31 1.55 3.82*** 1.173 0.430 4.24+ 1.21 0.47 
Anocracy x Corruption -0.31 0.63 -0.24 -0.66 0.651 -0.143 -0.60 0.64 -0.13 
N 81     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.273     0.279     0.292     
F 4.340+     5.204+     5.481+     
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed). B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: Standard error; Beta: 
Standardized coefficients. 
 
5.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In recent years, against the backdrop that some countries have achieved 
rapid economic growth under dictatorship and some newly democratized 
countries have experienced economic difficulties, the idea that a dictatorship is 
superior to a democracy in terms of economic growth has been gaining popu-
larity. 
 
This argument fails to consider the relationship between regime type and 
corruption, and thus it fails to help us understand why infant democracies tend 
to experience economic difficulties. This argument is also misleading in its 
conclusion that dictatorship is a superior political system in terms of deliver-
ing economic growth because the argument fails to take into consideration the 
role of corruption and its interactions with the regime type. The surge in cor-
ruption during transition is a by-product and thus should not be used as an 
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excuse for not undergoing transition. This is merely a convenient excuse for 
dictators to suppress democratization. 
 
China’s strong authoritarian state is used as an explanation of why it has 
performed better than Russia, at least economically. The longevity of the 
communist party’s monopoly on political power partially explains its econom-
ic gains. The argument advanced here is that authoritarian corruption is more 
efficient than dispersed or diffused corruption. Ironically, the Chinese gov-
ernment blames deviant individuals for corruption, rather than a flawed system, 
which is reminiscent of the Soviet Union era (Larsson, 2006). 
 
Policy makers in mature democracies and international agencies should 
promote democratization and at the same time they should help those coun-
tries undergoing transition to limit the period of chaos or anocracy. In addition, 
the policy makers in transition countries also should make efforts to curb cor-
ruption in fledgling democracies and to restructure their bureaucracies to min-
imize complementarities that tend to maximize corruption by government 
agencies. 
 
5.3 WHAT IS NEXT? FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Our study represents a first attempt in this research direction. Much more 
needs to be studied to fully understand the relationship between regime type 
and corruption. For example, we need to further examine the mechanism of 
corruption to provide a microscopic look at how the corruption-bribery rela-
tionship differs in various social environments (Li & Ouyang, 2007; Li & Wu, 
2010).We should also examine how a social culture moderates the effects of 
corruption on economic growth. A related topic is the organizational capacity 
of the state, or state capacity. We should examine those factors that determine 
state governance in order to better understand why some countries are gov-
erned more efficiently by dictatorial governments. We should also study gov-
ernance during the period of transition in order to find ways to minimize the 
governance vacuum that is often associated with transition. More attention 
should be directed towards the social cost of corruption, because even if it may 
be less harmful economically in autocracies, it increases social discontents 
towards corrupt officials and undermines social moral. 
 
Finally, joining the tenacious efforts of scholars and policy makers who 
are determined to fight against corruption, our study suggests that we are not 
losing the war in the sense that there are more non-democratic countries em-
barking on democratization than democratic countries retreating to autocracy. 
As we show here, democratization ultimately leads to low corruption. The 
challenge is to how to effectively complete the transition while keeping cor-
ruption in check. 
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APPENDIX A. COUNTRIES BY REGIME TYPE 
Autocracy (n=20)1 Anocracy (n=44) Democracy (n=94) 
Autocracy 
(n=20)2 
Closed Anocracy 
(n=25) 
Open 
Anocracy 
(n=19) 
Democracy 
(n=60) 
Full 
Democracy 
(n=34) 
Azerbaijan Angola Algeria Albania Latvia Australia 
Bahrain Burkina Faso Armenia Argentina Lebanon Austria 
Belarus Cameroon Bangladesh Belgium Lesotho Canada 
China 
Central African 
Republic 
Bhutan Benin Liberia Cape Verde 
Cuba Chad Cambodia Bolivia Macedonia Chile 
Eritrea Congo Kinshasa 
Congo Brazza-
ville 
Botswana Malawi Costa Rica 
Iran Egypt Djibouti Brazil Malaysia Cyprus 
Kazakhstan Equatorial Guinea Ecuador Bulgaria Mali Denmark 
Korea (North) Ethiopia Gabon Burundi Mexico Finland 
Kuwait Fiji Guinea Colombia Moldova Germany 
Laos Gambia Iraq Comoros Montenegro Greece 
Oman Jordan Madagascar Croatia Namibia Hungary 
Qatar Mauritania Mozambique 
Czech Repub-
lic 
Nepal Ireland 
Saudi Arabia Morocco Nigeria 
Dominican 
Republic 
Nicaragua Israel 
Swaziland Myanmar 
Papua New 
Guinea 
El Salvador Niger Italy 
Syria Rwanda Russia Estonia Pakistan Japan 
Turkmenistan Singapore Sri Lanka France Panama Lithuania 
UAE South Sudan Suriname Georgia Paraguay Luxembourg 
Uzbekistan Sudan Zimbabwe Ghana Peru Mauritius 
Vietnam Tajikistan  Guatemala Philippines Mongolia 
 Tanzania  Guinea-Bissau Romania Netherlands 
 Togo  Guyana Senegal New Zealand 
 Uganda  Honduras Serbia Norway 
 Venezuela  India Sierra Leone Poland 
 Yemen  Indonesia 
Solomon 
Islands 
Portugal 
   Jamaica South Africa 
Slovak Repub-
lic 
   Kenya Thailand Slovenia 
   Korea (South) Turkey Spain 
   Kosovo Ukraine Sweden 
   Kyrgyzstan Zambia Switzerland 
     
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
     
United King-
dom 
     United States 
     Uruguay 
1. The three categories are the authors converted from The Polity IV Project. 2. The five categories are classified by 
The Polity IV Project. 
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APPENDIX B. Rerun of Panel A of Table 5 using Five Categories of  
Regime Type 
Dependent Variable: GDPgrowth_5YA 
Models Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Corruption Measure CPI_5YA CPI2011R CPI2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.186* 2.63   4.732** 2.64   4.473** 2.62   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.165+ 0.05 -0.53 -0.170+ 0.05 -0.54 -0.168+ 0.05 -0.54 
Literacy -0.006 0.02 -0.04 -0.006 0.02 -0.04 -0.006 0.02 -0.04 
Employment_5YA 0.049*** 0.02 0.24 0.046** 0.02 0.22 0.048*** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.009* 0.01 0.15 0.009 0.01 0.15 0.008* 0.01 0.15 
Autocracy 2.522*** 0.96 0.29 2.524*** 0.94 0.29 2.569*** 0.95 0.30 
Closed Anocracy 1.783** 0.85 0.27 1.769** 0.84 0.27 1.833** 0.85 0.28 
Open Anocracy 1.773** 0.90 0.21 1.750** 0.89 0.21 1.853** 0.90 0.22 
Democracy 0.699 0.68 0.13 0.724 0.68 0.14 0.749 0.68 0.14 
Corruption -0.420** 0.25 -0.22 -0.465** 0.23 -0.25 -0.454** 0.24 -0.25 
N 101     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.33     0.337     0.334     
F 6.466+     6.648+     6.574+     
Models Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Corruption Measure ICRG2012R CoCorrupt2011R CoCorrupt2010R 
IV B SE. Beta B SE. Beta B SE. Beta 
(Constant) 4.934** 2.82   1.305 2.03   1.291 2.03   
GNI_PC_PPP_5YA -0.155+ 0.04 -0.51 -0.134+ 0.04 -0.43 -0.134+ 0.04 -0.43 
Literacy -0.015 0.02 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.009 0.02 -0.07 
Employment_5YA 0.034* 0.03 0.14 0.047** 0.02 0.23 0.047** 0.02 0.23 
Trade_5YA 0.010* 0.01 0.17 0.009* 0.01 0.16 0.009* 0.01 0.16 
Autocracy 3.479*** 1.18 0.34 2.391*** 0.98 0.28 2.411*** 0.98 0.28 
Closed Anocracy 2.020** 0.96 0.29 1.651** 0.87 0.25 1.677** 0.87 0.25 
Open Anocracy 1.615** 0.97 0.20 1.694** 0.93 0.20 1.700** 0.92 0.20 
Democracy 1.019* 0.77 0.19 0.673 0.71 0.13 0.692 0.71 0.13 
Corruption -0.699** 0.37 -0.22 -0.407 0.39 -0.12 -0.425 0.39 -0.12 
N 83     101     101     
Adjusted R Square 0.339     0.316     0.317     
F 5.668+     6.138+     6.160+     
*p< 0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; +p<0.001 (all1-tailed). B: Unstandardized coefficients; S.E.: Standard error; Beta: 
Standardized coefficients 
